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A B S T R A C T
Cognitive accounts of creativity generally assume that novel ideas originate in the head and precede the actual
materialization of them. Over the last decades, this cognitive view has been criticized by, among others, pro-
ponents of a sociocultural perspective. In the present paper, we aim to further this critique by developing a
genuine ecological approach to creativity in making. We do so by incorporating Ingold's theory of making into
the ecological perspective that was initiated by Gibson. It is argued that because action is not preplanned but
continuously unfolds over time, creativity is to be found in the process of making. Indeed, creativity can be
conceived of as the discovery and creation of unconventional affordances (action possibilities) of objects and
materials. Discussing the primacy of exploratory actions in this process, we argue that the concepts and research
tools of ecological psychology may help to deepen the understanding of the creative process.
1. Introduction
[T]he drawing is not the visible shadow of a mental event; it is a
process of thinking, not the projection of thought. (Ingold, 2013, p. 128;
emphases in original)
How is it possible that humans come up with ideas, thoughts, pro-
ducts, and ways of acting that did not exist before and are meaningful?
Unsurprisingly, in addressing questions like this, different academic
disciplines have paid attention to different aspects. Within the fields of
arts, architecture, and archeology, the focus tends to be on the novel
material product that is realized and the historical and social context in
which that happened (e.g., Gombrich, 1950/1995; Frampton, 1980). In
psychology on the other hand, the focus is not so much on the material
object per se, but on how the new idea in the mind of the designer or
actor takes shape (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios & Beeman,
2014; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010; Simonton, 2007a,
2007b). Yet, the underlying theory in these different academic dis-
ciplines tends to be the same. They generally adhere to what Ingold
(2013) referred to as “hylomorphism”,
This is to start with an idea in mind, of what we want to achieve, and
with a supply of the raw material needed to achieve it. And it is to
finish at the moment when the material has taken on the intended
form. (p. 20)
The novel idea in the mind of the designer and the material object
that is subsequently constructed are isomorphic. The mental idea is
supposed to instruct the (mechanical) body to impose the novel form on
the material.
Over the last years this approach has been criticized by several
authors (e.g., Costall, 2015; Glaveanu, 2014; Glaveanu, Gillespie, &
Valsiner, 2015; Ingold, 2013; Malafouris, 2013). Shifting focus to the
sociomaterial processes, they argued that creativity does not reside in
the mind of the individual but is relational and extends into the (social)
world. Glaveanu (2014), for example, argued that “creative action is
distributed between multiple actors, creations, places and times” (p. 2;
emphases in original). In the present paper, we aim to further the cri-
tique on the cognitive account by developing a genuine ecological ap-
proach to creativity, focusing on how goal-directed activity comes
about. We will do so incorporating Ingold's recent ideas of making into
the ecological framework that was developed by Gibson. It is argued
that because behavior is not preplanned in the mind, but emerges out of
the interplay of movement and information, creativity does not so much
exist in the head but in the unfolding of action (see Hristovski, Davids,
Araujo, and Passos (2011) and Orth, van der Kamp, Memmert, and
Savelsbergh (2017) for accounts of creativity in movement sciences that
follow a similar line of thinking). Moreover, we claim that Gibson's
conceptual framework can further the investigation into creativity. It
not only allows us to define creativity (see also Glaveanu, 2012; Yakhlef
& Rietveld, 2017), but the ecological concepts of information, attune-
ment, and exploratory behavior can also further (empirical) investiga-
tions into making and creativity.
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2. Some cognitive perspectives on creativity
Cognitive theories of creativity come in many forms. Applying the
principles of classic cognitive psychology, Simon and colleagues de-
fended the idea that creativity can simply be understood as general
problem solving (e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972). Qin and Simon (1990),
for example, conducted an experiment in which participants were to
discover one of Kepler's laws, and the problem-solving searches of the
participants were recorded. Based on their results, Qin and Simon
concluded that, “the data for the successful subjects reveal no ‘creative’
processes in this kind of a discovery situation different from those that
are regularly observed in all kinds of problem-solving settings” (p. 281).
Indeed, one can write a computer program to solve this problem. Other
researchers, however, have argued that unlike the deliberate analytic
problem solving, creative insight genuinely reflects certain cognitive
processes working together (e.g., Kounios & Beeman, 2014). Moreover,
individual differences in solving problems in a sudden flash of insight
are associated with different patterns in resting-state brain activity,
particularly in the anterior cingulate of the right hemisphere (e.g.,
Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios & Beeman, 2014). In fact, re-
searchers have stimulated these brain areas to try to facilitate creative
insight (e.g., Chi & Snyder, 2011).
Earlier, Campbell (1960) defended a theory of creativity that is
based on the Darwinian idea of variation and selection (see also
Simonton, 1999). In his view, knowledge processes, including creative
thought, are governed by a “blind-variation-and-selective-retention
process” (Campbell, 1960, p. 380). New ideas “uncorrelated with the
solution” (Campbell, 1960, p. 381) to problems are produced and am-
plified, and some of them are selected. In laying out his theory,
Campbell focuses on scientific discoveries that he illustrated with re-
flections of scholars as Bain, Mach, and Poincaré. However, his theory is
also used to understand artistic creativity of musicians and painters (see
e.g., Simonton, 2007a, 2007b). The overall claim is that generating
more ideas, typically through many years of persistent effort, should
lead to more ideas that are creative. Creativity thus arises from sheer
productivity, not from special psychological or cognitive predisposi-
tions.
Trying to combine many aspects of the above accounts, Nijstad et al.
(2010) developed a “dual-pathway theory of creativity”. According to
this theory, there are two ways to achieve novel and creative ideas:
through the “flexibility” pathway and through the “persistence”
pathway. Flexibility indicates that creative ideas can be generated by
switching to a different approach, considering a different perspective
and by making remote associations, but creativity can also be achieved
more analytically through systematic, focused, and effortful thinking.
To generate creative ideas in problem solving, people interchangeably
use the flexibility and persistence pathways but to different degrees
depending on the individual's psychological and cognitive dispositions
(e.g., working memory) and traits (e.g., mood and attention) and on
situational factors (e.g., insight versus divergent thinking tasks). Hence,
the interaction between flexible and persistent ways of thinking to-
gether with the factors that modulate them account for (variation in)
human creativity.
Although cognitive theories of creativity can be rather diverse, they
share, arguably by definition, the assumption that creativity resides in
the mental realm—the formation of novel ideas occurs in the head. And
when the idea concerns a novel object or product, the idea can (or
cannot) be materialized through a process of making, but this latter
process is not considered to be constitutive of the creativity. Indeed, the
idea emerged prior to the construction of the product, the latter being a
mere materialization of the mental idea.
3. An ecological view on how action emerges
The above line of thinking, in which the idea exists prior to the
actual product or the creation of it, is deeply rooted in Western
thinking. When patterns are to be explained, Western scientists gen-
erally assume that this pattern already existed, albeit in an abstract
form. Ingold (2011) referred to this as the “logic of inversion” (p. 68). In
the field of biology, for example, it is widely assumed that the genes
contain a blueprint of the animal that guides the developmental process
such that a certain animate form is realized. And traditional accounts of
human movement claim that movement patterns are the result of a
motor program, residing in the brain, which instructs the body what to
do. Hence, in these accounts it is assumed that the animate form and the
movement already existed in abstract forms in either the genes or the
brain, respectively. Drawing upon the work of Gibson and Ingold, we
describe an ecological approach to action that takes aim at this “logic of
inversion” and holds that behavior continuously unfolds. Such an ac-
count necessitates a theory in which creativity resides in the unfolding
of the action.
3.1. Gibson's ecological program
In the 1960s and 1970s Gibson developed an approach to psy-
chology that was diametrically opposed to the dominant cognitive
tradition. Indeed, Gibson took aim at the idea that the brain controls
action, an assumption that holds psychology captive since the late 17th
century (e.g., Martensen, 2004; Zimmer, 2004). As he stated in his last
book, The ecological approach to visual perception, “[l]ocomotion and
manipulation […] are controlled not by the brain, but by information,
that is, by seeing oneself in the world. Control lies in the animal-en-
vironment system” (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 225). Gibson developed
several concepts to understand how behavior can “be regular without
being regulated” (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 225). For now, the concepts of
information and affordances are most important.
Gibson introduced the concept of affordances to refer to the action
possibilities of the environment for a certain animal.
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford
is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have
made it up. (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 127; emphases in original)
So, for example, for a human being a chair affords sitting and the
floor affords walking. By stressing that the environment consists of
possibilities for action, and that animals perceive their environment in
these terms, Gibson emphasized that the world is not primarily to look
at but to act in. Moreover, the concept of affordances indicates that the
environment in which animals live is a meaningful one. Being rooted in
the mechanization of the worldview, psychology has traditionally as-
sumed that the environment simply consists of matter in motion and
that meaning has to be attached to it in a perceptual process (e.g.,
Neisser, 1967). However, if the environment consists of possibilities for
action, then meaning does not have to imposed but can be discovered.
Indeed, “the meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords”
(Gibson, 1982, p. 407).
To understand how the animal can perceive the affordances and
regulate their encounters with them, the Gibsonian concept of in-
formation is crucial. Gibson stated that in the ambient arrays sur-
rounding an animal there are patterns available that inform about the
available affordances. Moreover, this information can also guide our
activities in the environment to use an affordance. A classic example is
the use of optic flow fields to guide locomotion (Gibson, 1958). Imagine
a bird flying through the air. The movement of the bird through the air
gives rise to an optic flow field that provides information about the
animal's movements through the environment. Consequently, this in-
formation can guide the bird's behavior. The focus of expansion (the
point at which the motion appears to arise), for example, coincides with
the direction in which the bird is heading and can thus be used to na-
vigate through the environment.
Hence, goal-directed behavior can result from the interplay of
movement and information—the animal's behavior can be guided by
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the information in the optic flow that is the result of its movements.
Ever since Gibson laid out his programmatic approach, ecological
psychologists have applied his ideas, often in combination with the
theory of self-organization, to a variety of tasks (e.g., Fajen, 2007;
Kelso, 1995; Kugler & Turvey, 1987; Warren, 2006). Importantly, this
program of work demonstrates that goal-directed actions can be ex-
plained without recourse to motor programs residing in the brain. In-
deed, the underlying idea of all these applications has been that goal-
directed behavior emerges from the interactions between animal and
environment. “[A] pattern of behavior […] does not reside a priori in
the individual components of the system but is a consequence of their
interdependence and interaction” (Warren, 2006, p. 362).
If there is no ideational preplanning involved in the generation of
behavior, as the ecological approach suggests, then the mainstream
cognitive perspectives on creativity, in which an idea first emerges in
the mind that then instructs the body, are misguided from the very
start. Indeed, the premise that the interaction between animal and
environment is foundational implies that creativity is to be sought not
in the head but in the unfolding of the action; that is, in how the animal
encounters the environment, in the perception, creation, and use of
affordances. This brings us to the insights of Tim Ingold.
3.2. Ingold's theory of making
Ever since the 1990s, Ingold has been inspired by Gibsonian
thinking (see e.g., Ingold, 2000). Although the references to Gibson's
work are scarce in his latest books (Ingold, 2013, 2015), the influence
of the founder of the ecological approach to psychology on Ingold's
thinking persists. In his book Making, Ingold (2013), too, argued against
the idea that the brain imposes behavior. Indeed, in his account of
creativity, Ingold puts the process of making center stage (see also
Glaveanu, 2014; Malafouris, 2013).
I want to think of making […] as a process of growth. This is to place
the maker from the outset as a participant in amongst a world of
active materials. These materials are what he has to work with, and
in the process of making he ‘joins forces’ with them, bringing them
together or splitting them apart, synthesizing and distilling, in an-
ticipation of what might emerge. (Ingold, 2013, p. 21; emphasis in
original).
Hence, the maker is not imposing form on the materials of the
world, rather he is working with them.
[t]he most he can do is to intervene in worldly processes that are
going on, and which give rise to the forms of the living world that
we see all around us—in plants and animals, in waves of water,
snow and sand, in rocks and clouds—adding his own impetus to the
forces and energies in play. (Ingold, 2013, p. 21, p. 21)
Ingold argued that there are only soft boundaries between artifacts
and patterns in nature. Indeed, the difference between a statue and a
stalagmite is not that the former is made and the latter is not; rather the
statue is partly the result of human intervention and the stalagmite is
generally not. Indeed, in the formation of the statue, the sculptor used
her tools to “release the form” out of the lump of marble. But, among
other things, the qualities of the marble that are the result of its for-
mative history also play an important role in this process. Hence, the
sculptor does not impose the form on the material; rather it is in her
“engagement with materials” (Ingold, 2013, p. 22) that the form takes
shape.
The research of Bril and colleagues on stone knapping of Indian
craftsman provides an apt illustration of this (e.g., Nonaka & Bril, 2012,
2014; Roux, Bril, & Dietrich, 1995). They analyzed the hammering
behavior of Indian craftsmen who make stone beads. In one hand the
craftsman holds a piece of stone to position it against the tip of an iron
bar and in the other hand he holds the hammer. The hammer strikes the
stone three to four times each second to fracture the stone, while the
stone is continually repositioned. By detaching flakes, the stone is
shaped into the desired parallelepiped form. Nonaka and Bril (2014)
showed that hammering is not stereotypical, but that strikes vary from
one repetition to the other in both amplitude and pace. In fact, they
argued that the exhibited knapping behavior is an example par ex-
cellence of what Bernstein (1996) called “dexterity”—the knapper's
actions “exhibits exquisite context sensitivity, implying the efficacy of
exploration to detect the task-relevant information” (Nonaka & Bril,
2014, p. 218). The observations of Bril and colleagues demonstrated
that the production of beads is a far cry from merely instilling a form on
a rough material. Dexterous making requires high sensitivity to the
material one is working with.
Ingold (2013, 2015) introduced the concept of correspondence to
explain the character of the process of human intervention in the
“worldly processes”. It is important to stress that Ingold did not use the
concept of correspondence to refer to a mediational theory of knowl-
edge, in which a mental representation and the world correspond (see
Dreyfus and Taylor (2015) for a nice description and critique of this
position). Instead, in Ingold's view the maker and the material she is
working with co-respond. The maker applies forces and the material
responds, which, in turn, leads to a response of the maker and so forth.
To explain this process to his students in his exceptional course The 4
As, Ingold (2013, pp. 22–24) went to the beach with his class and asked
each student to create a basket. To that end, a fair amount of branches
were placed vertically in the sand, in the form of circle. These branches
were tied together at the top to form a frame, and the student was to
horizontally weave branches through this frame to make a basket.
Many of the students were surprised by “the recalcitrant nature of the
material” (Ingold, 2013, p. 22); it was not easy to bent the branches in
the shape of the basket, but it was through the ensuing friction with the
other branches that the basket eventually took shape. Hence, “[t]he
form was not imposed on the material from without, but was rather
generated in this force field, comprised by the relations between the
weaver and the willow” (Ingold, 2013, pp. 22–23). Indeed, to master
the skill of basket making, one has to learn to “join forces” with the
force field that results from the maker's weaving together of several
branches, arguably each with their own character.
An important implication of Ingold's perspective is that it entails
that creativity abounds in animal life. It is not simply an idiosyncratic
quality of a genius who develops something that did not exist before.
Rather, also the students who aim at making a basket for the first time
were creative in that they had to improvise in the process of weaving
the branches into a basket. As Ingold and Hallam (2007) put it, “People
have to work it out as they go along. In a word, they have to improvise”
(p. 1).
4. But what about the creation of new objects?
One might argue that the above argument simply aims at shifting
focus in the study of creativity. Whereas the cognitive accounts con-
centrate on the mental origin of new objects, the above perspective
redirects the attention to the qualities of the process of making them,
that is, towards the engagement with the material. Indeed, reading the
above, an advocate of hylomorphism might admit that there is crea-
tivity involved in the process of making, but does not find a compelling
argument against her view that novel ideas (the objects’ blueprints)
originate in the head. Yet, grounding creativity in the unfolding of the
action aims at overturning the theory of hylomorphism (see also
Glaveanu, 2014; Glaveanu, Gillespie, & Valsiner, 2015; Malafouris,
2013).
After scrutinizing the process of making and the phenomenon of
correspondence, Ingold claimed that the traditional theory that assumes
that the idea exists prior to the creation of the object has it completely
backwards. A craftsman (or any other person) does not “make through
thinking”, but “thinks through making” (Ingold, 2013, p. 6; emphases in
original). It is in the process of making that creativity emerges.
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[d]rawing that tells is a correspondence, of kinaesthetic awareness
and the line of flight. In this correspondence, as Bryson says (2003:
154), ‘the mark on the paper leads as much as it is led’ […]. Thus the
drawing is not the visible shadow of a mental event; it is a process of
thinking, not the projection of thought” (Ingold, 2013, p. 128; em-
phases in original).
There is no mind hidden behind our actions (e.g., Reed, 1996; van
Dijk & Withagen, 2014). Note that the correspondence perspective does
not imply that ideas are not involved in the creative process. Rather, it
asserts that ideas do not originate in an isolated brain, but emerge in the
practical engagement with materials. Hence, ideas are not the starting
point of working with materials, and by no means instruct the body.
Instead, we believe that ideas are better thought of as constrains that
originate in the correspondence of maker and material. It is important
to stress that this general portrayal of the creative process leaves room
for the different types of creativity that have been distinguished in the
literature (e.g., Galenson, 2006; Glaveanu et al., 2013). It is compatible
with the experimental (i.e. trial-and-error) approach of some artists, but
also with the more conceptual way of working in which artists are
constrained by ideas. The correspondence perspective has just a dif-
ferent stance on the origin of ideas and what they do.
Although being inspired by Gibson's thinking, Ingold did not adopt
Gibson's conceptual framework in his account of making and creativity.
However, in the remainder of this paper, we will argue that Gibson's
ecological framework can further the investigation into creativity and
making. It not only allows us to define creativity (see also Costall, 2015;
Glaveanu, 2012; Yakhlef & Rietveld, 2017), but can also guide the
empirical research into it.
4.1. Creativity from an affordance perspective
In his chapter on affordances, Gibson (1979/1986) had already
emphasized that generally one can do many things with an object.
The fact that a stone is a missile does not imply that it cannot be
other things as well. It can be a paperweight, a bookend, a hammer,
or a pendulum bob. It can be piled on another rock to make a cairn
or a stone wall. (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 134).
Indeed, a single object generally affords multiple actions to an an-
imal. Cutting (1982, p. 216) once enumerated the actions a single piece
of paper affords a human being. It affords “writing gibberish and son-
nets”, “making a map”, “writing nothing upon”, “making paper dolls”,
“cleaning gaps between teeth”, and so on.
Yet despite this almost infinite number of actions that a single object
may afford, objects tend to be used in particular ways. Within the so-
ciocultural setting that we inevitable act in, there are conventional and
normative ways of using objects. Over the last decades, a growing
number of ecological psychologists have stressed this sociocultural
perspective on affordances (e.g., Costall, 1995, 2012; Heft, 2001, 2007;
Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Rietveld, 2008; van Dijk & Rietveld, 2017;
van Dijk & Withagen, 2014). Two aspects of this perspective are im-
portant for our purposes. First, the environment we live in is largely the
result of human intervention. Indeed, we have altered the environment
substantially, created houses, bridges, tools and so on, all of which are
the result of social practices (e.g., Costall, 1995, 2012; Heft, 2001,
2007; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Withagen & van Wermeskerken,
2010). Second, we learn the affordances of our environment through
other people. Drawing upon the work of Leont'ev (1981), Costall (1995)
claimed that we do not simply encounter objects in the world but are
“introduced to them” (p. 472; emphasis in original). Indeed, in what
Reed (1996; see also Reed & Bril, 1996) called “the field of promoted
action”, adults direct the children's attention to certain affordances of
objects and show how the objects ought to be used (see Withagen &
Caljouw, 2017; for an example in the field of playgrounds).
In the context of this sociocultural perspective on affordances,
Costall (2012, 2015) introduced the concept of canonical affordances.
Canonical affordances are conventional and normative. It is only in
such cases that it makes sense to talk of the affordance of the object.
Chairs, for example, are for sitting-on, even though we may also use
them in many other ways. (Costall, 2012, p. 85; emphases in ori-
ginal)
As already argued by Glaveanu (2012) and Yakhlef and Rietveld
(2017), this sociocultural perspective on affordances allows us to con-
ceive of creativity as the unconventional use of an object's affordances.
Two obvious examples are Picasso's sculpture The Bull's head (see also
Costall, 2015) and Nouvel's Dollhouse. The canonical affordance of a
bicycle's saddle is to sit on, and that of a bicycle's steer is to hold on for
balance and changing direction. Yet, Picasso showed that when the
saddle and the steer are combined, they also afford the visual im-
pression of the head of a bull. And Nouvel changed a toolbox into a
dollhouse. Although the canonical affordance of the box's compart-
ments is to store tools, now each compartment was a room with a
specific purpose in the house. Small windows were made in the exterior
of the box, but because the toolbox could be opened at the top, all
rooms were easily accessible (see Hertzberger, 1999, p. 35).
We believe that this conceptualization of creativity as the un-
conventional use of affordances can also be applied to working with
materials like clay, paint, steel, and stone, and thus covers arguably all
craftwork and art forms. As an example, one can argue that Mondriaan
discovered and created new affordances. In an endless process of co-
responding with (colored) lines and rectangular forms, Mondriaan re-
vealed a way of painting that gives rise to new impressions of rhythm
and nature (e.g., Janssen, 2016). Obviously, Mondriaan could not go
beyond the affordances of the material he was working with (canvas,
paint, and, in a later stage, tape) but he used them in a way that was not
conventional in the art of painting at his time. In like fashion, one can
think of creativity in other art forms, working with different materials.
It is important to stress, though, that an unconventional use of af-
fordances is only a necessary condition for creativity in making, not a
sufficient one. The use of the affordances should not simply break the
convention but should also be meaningful, or as Boden (1996) claimed
in her classic paper on creativity “interesting” (p. 75). In Ruspoli's
(2010) movie Being in the world, Dreyfus mentioned the example of a
person undressing himself and rolling in a flower field while his col-
leagues are having lunch in that garden. Although such an action is
certainly exceptional, it is by no means meaningful and, thus, not
creative. Indeed, to be meaningful it should have some continuity with
the norms and values that are shared within the sociocultural practice
the agent is acting in (e.g., Glaveanu, 2014; Glaveanu et al., 2015).
Picasso's, Nouvel's, and Mondiaan's creations obviously do so within the
domain of art, but the person taking a flower bath is not acting within
the confines of the shared norms in his culture.
4.2. The primacy of exploratory behavior in creativity
As Gibson (1966, 1979/1986) had already emphasized, the per-
ception and discovery of affordances is a process in which the body
actively explores the environment. Over the last decades, the primacy
of the body's exploratory behavior for the perception of affordances is
well documented (e.g., Cole, Robinson, & Adolph, 2016; Gibson, 1963;
Mark, Jiang, Steinbach King, & Paasche, 1999; Riley, Wagman,
Santana, Carello, & Turvey, 2002). Although this research has focused
on the discovery of conventional affordances, there is no reason to as-
sume that exploratory behavior is not equally important in the dis-
covery of unconventional affordances (e.g., Hristovski et al., 2011;
Malafouris, 2013). Indeed, in their ethnographic research on the design
process, Rietveld and Brouwers (2017) pointed at the active bodily
engagement of the architects. These authors studied the designing of
Secret Operation 610, a mobile sculpture/office that provided a
working environment for researchers/designers. In the process of
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developing the sculpture, exploratory behavior appeared to be crucial.
When RR moves the cardboard model around on the table, he lets go
of the model when he seems satisfied with its position and im-
mediately starts looking for the best position in relation to the model
by moving his chair around and bending forward. When designing
the architects often pick up a model, draw or sketch. They some-
times hold a model up in front of them in the air and turn it around
while they try out different positions. They move their bodies and
aspects of the surroundings such as their chairs in relation to the
design as it is made at that moment, and the other way around. They
only stop when (sufficient) optimal visibility is achieved; moments
at which RR often sighs: ‘Okay, now I can see it (better)’. (Rietveld &
Brouwers, 2017, p. 555, p. 555)
Although such ethnographic studies are very insightful in revealing
the exploratory behavior of the makers (see also Malafouris, 2013), we
think that they can be complemented and arguably deepened by ap-
plying the concepts and research tools of the ecological approach. In-
deed, this is likely to provide a more precise account of the information
that is used in the creative process and the exploratory behavior that is
accompanied with it. For example, in their study on the haptic per-
ception of hand-held objects, Riley et al. (2002) showed that the ex-
ploratory, wielding behavior depends on which of the object's affor-
dances is perceived. The tools to study such search or exploratory
behavior (e.g., recurrence analyses; fractal scaling) can be used to re-
veal what exploratory movements are required for an (unconventional)
affordance to be perceived. Relatedly, there is a growing body of re-
search showing that skilled agents rely on different informational
variables than novices (for overviews see e.g. Dicks, van der Kamp,
Withagen, & Koedijker, 2015; Jacobs & Michaels, 2007). As already
argued by the Gibsons (Gibson & Gibson, 1955), expertise is partly
determined by what informational variables one is attuned to. To use
one of their examples, a connoisseur is able to detect information in the
wine that a novice wine taster is not capable of. Hence, revealing the
information that a maker detects might not only help in understanding
her skilled, sentient correspondence with the material she is working
with, but might also account for her creativity. After all, creative in-
dividuals (or teams) might attend to different informational variables
than people who are less creative.
It is important to stress that such ecological studies would not ne-
cessarily turn the research on creativity into a laboratory science,
putting the maker into a sterile, completely controlled environment that
might kill any creativity from the very start. Indeed, the ecological
studies of Bril and colleagues (e.g., Nonaka & Bril, 2012, 2014; Roux
et al., 1995), that we referred to in Section 3.2, offer a case in point.
Many of their studies on stone knapping is genuine field work in which
the maker is studied in his natural habitat. Yet the ecological concepts
and research tools proved their mettle in understanding the context-
sensitivity of the knapping, the different levels of expertise, and how
the skill is acquired.
5. Concluding remarks
In the present paper, we have sketched the outlines of a genuine
ecological approach to creativity in making. We did so by embedding
Ingold's theory of making in the ecological framework that was devel-
oped by Gibson. Although the sketched approach has some continuity
with a recent sociocultural perspective on creativity (e.g., Glaveanu,
2014; Glaveanu et al., 2015), it focusses explicitly on the goal-directed
and exploratory activities of the maker. By arguing that behavior is not
preplanned but unfolds over time, we argued that creativity has to be
found not in the head, but in the process of making. As Malafouris
(2013) eloquently put it when discussing pottery,
[T]he constituents of the creative process are not to be found before
or outside the throwing or shaping of the pot. The constituents of
creativity are in the throwing, in the shaping. The creative process
becomes, then, a binding of materials—a dynamic flow of the or-
ganic into the inorganic that can be understood as a new or ‘sur-
prising’ blend of ingredients that can act or be acted upon. (p.
212–213; emphases in original)
That is, creativity does not precede making, but is an integral part of
it. Although the concept of affordances has already been adopted by a
few experts on creativity (e.g., Glaveanu, 2012, 2014:; Malafouris,
2013), Gibson's overall conceptual framework has received scant at-
tention in the creativity literature. Yet, as we have argued in the present
paper, the ecological concepts of information, attunement, and ex-
ploratory behavior (and the tools to study them) are likely to help in
deepening the understanding of the skilled and sentient correspondence
of maker and material, a process in which the creativity resides.
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